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Some zoonotic pathogens cause sporadic infection in humans but rarely propagate further, while others
have succeeded in overcoming the species barrier and becoming established in the human population.
Adaptation, driven by selection pressure in human hosts, can play a signiﬁcant role in allowing pathogens
to cross this species barrier. Here we use a simple mathematical model to study potential epidemiological
markers of adaptation. We ask: under what circumstances could ongoing adaptation be signalled by large
clusters of human infection? If a pathogen has caused hundreds of cases but with little transmission, does
this indicate that the species barrier cannot be crossed? Finally, how can case reports be monitored to
detect an imminent emergence event? We distinguish evolutionary scenarios under which adaptation is
likely to be signalled by large clusters of infection and under which emergence is likely to occur without
any prior warning. Moreover, we show that a lack of transmission never rules out adaptability, regardless
of how many zoonoses have occurred. Indeed, after the ﬁrst 100 zoonotic cases, continuing sporadic zoo-
notic infections without onward, human-to-human transmission offer little extra information on pathogen
adaptability. Finally, we present a simple method for monitoring outbreaks for signs of emergence and
discuss public health implications.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many novel human infections have zoonotic origins
(Morens et al. 2004; Wolfe et al. 2007; Jones et al.
2008). For example, HIV was acquired from African
primates (Rambaut et al. 2004; Keele et al. 2006);
SARS coronavirus has been linked to both bats (Li et al.
2005) and palm civets (Guan et al. 2003); and a recent
new arenavirus which killed four out of ﬁve cases in
Southern Africa is probably derived from rodents
(Briese et al. 2009). A novel H1N1 inﬂuenza A virus, in
the early months of a pandemic at the time of writing,
was introduced into the human population via swine
(Smith et al. 2009).
Here we study the epidemiology associated with the
establishment of a pathogen in a new host species. As dis-
cussed by Antia et al. (2003) even a pathogen poorly
transmitted among humans, and thus capable only of
causing sporadic cases, can acquire adaptations to
become capable of sustained human transmission. Such
adaptations could arise in response to the selective
pressure exerted by the new host environment. Addition-
ally, changing human contact patterns and environmental
factors can have the same effect, of enhancing pathogen
transmissibility (Woolhouse et al. 2005). For example,
the avian inﬂuenza subtype H5N1 has caused over 400
human cases (World Health Organization 2009), mostly
through close contact with infected poultry (Beigel et al.
2005). Although it has shown little or no transmission
between humans, the possibility of its future adaptation
to humans cannot be ruled out.
Previous work on evolving pathogens has studied the
effect of host heterogeneity (Yates et al.2 0 0 6 ) and patho-
gen life history (Andre ´ & Day 2005) on the probability
of emergence, per introduction into the human population.
Here we ask: what are the epidemiological signs that a
pathogen is evolving to adapt for human transmission?
For example, under what conditions would such a process
be signalled by large outbreaks of infection? Conversely,
some pathogens, while capable of infecting humans, may
face biological barriers to human adaptation that preclude
their ultimate establishment. Is it possible, from case
reports, to distinguish such pathogens from those inher-
ently capable of adaptation? Finally, how can case reports
be monitored to detect when an ongoing outbreak is about
to develop into a full-blown emergence? We approach these
questions using simple mathematical models of within-host
evolution and between-host transmission. This paper is
organized as follows: following a brief discussion of the
relationship between pathogen reproductive ﬁtness and
outbreak sizes, we present a simple mathematical model
of evolution and transmission, and apply it to the questions
posed above. We use examples from H5N1 inﬂuenza case
report data to illustrate the results. Finally, we discuss
some public health implications of this work.
2. REPRODUCTIVE FITNESS AND
OUTBREAK SIZES
The basic reproductive number, R0, is the average
number of secondary cases arising from a single infected
case, in an otherwise susceptible population (Anderson &
May 1991). It is a measure of emergence potential, as
R0 . 1 is a necessary condition for emergence. It is, how-
ever, not a sufﬁcient condition, as such pathogens are
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n,
where n is the number of index cases (May et al.2 0 0 1 ).
Conversely, infections with R0 , 1 stutter to extinction
with probability 1. Moreover, different regimes for R0 , 1
show differing epidemiological behaviour in terms of
the numbers of cases that outbreaks could involve.
Figure 1 shows the probability distributions for outbreak
sizes for R0 ¼ 0.1 (a poorly adapted pathogen) and
R0 ¼ 0.9 (an almost-adapted pathogen). Although neither
pathogen is capable of emergence, it is evident that a
pathogen with R0 ¼ 0.9 is capable of causing much
larger outbreaks than one with R0 ¼ 0.1. Indeed, the
mean outbreak size for R0 , 1 is given by 1/(1 2 R0)
(Becker 1974).
3. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL
We now incorporate adaptation, using a modiﬁed version
of a model presented by Antia et al. (2003), based on
multi-type branching processes. The biological motiv-
ation for the model is as follows: an index individual
infected with a wild-type (poorly adapted) pathogen is
likely to die or recover without infecting anyone else.
However, owing to the possibility of the pathogen
mutating to acquire some transmission potential, this
index case has a non-zero probability of infecting another
person. Subsequent adaptations can serve to increase the
probability of transmission still further. The stochastic
process continues either until extinction of the pathogen,
after a certain number of cases, or until emergence of an
adapted pathogen. The latter may be subject to yet
further adaptations, but we do not consider these stages
here. In case of extinction, the process is repeated with
another new introduction of a wild-type pathogen from
the animal reservoir. In this way, we simulate a series of
introductions leading to emergence. Whereas Antia
et al. (2003) presented a discrete-time model, ours is a
continuous-time process as we are also interested in the
time course of an outbreak. Moreover, as discussed
below, in this model the role of R0 is to reﬂect relative
probabilities of transmission and recovery; in the context
of continuous time, this allows a more natural description
of the process of adaptation.
We assume that the host population is sufﬁciently large
to neglect depletion of susceptibles: this is feasible in the
early stages of emergence, where there are only compara-
tively few cases. For simplicity, we also assume that the
host population is homogeneous in susceptibility to
infection. Furthermore, we assume that the pathogen
has to undergo a series of discrete ‘steps’ in order to
adapt for human transmission, with each step acquiring
an increment in its reproductive number. Thus, we label
each adaptive stage with i, where i ¼ 0 is the wild-type
stage and i ¼ n is the adapted stage. We also have a
series of reproductive numbers R0
(0), R0
(1),..., R0
(n),
where the wild-type ﬁtness R0
(0) is much less than 1 and
only the adapted ﬁtness R0
(n) exceeds 1. Finally, with
each adaptive stage we associate a mutation rate, denoted
M
(i). We assume that if infection within a host develops
an adaptation, it goes to ﬁxation in that host and is thus
the only ‘type’ that can be subsequently transmitted.
Together the parameters R0
(i) and M
(i) deﬁne the
stochastic process of evolution and infection as follows.
For a given infected individual, there are three possible
events that could occur next: transmission, pathogen
adaptation, and host recovery/death. These have
probabilities pi, qi, ri, respectively, where
pi ¼
R
ðiÞ
0
1 þ R
ðiÞ
0 þ MðiÞ
; qi ¼
MðiÞ
1 þ R
ðiÞ
0 þ MðiÞ
and ri ¼
1
1 þ R
ðiÞ
0 þ MðiÞ
:
The terms in the denominator arise from rescaling time
by the mean infectious period: see appendix in the
electronic supplementary material for details of deri-
vations. Using the well-established Gillespie algorithm
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Figure 1. Outbreak size distributions for ﬁxed R0.( a) R0 ¼ 0.1 and (b) R0 ¼ 0.9. These distributions have mean 1/(1 2 R0).
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simulated in continuous time. In the case of an infection
eventually going extinct, any human cases arising from the
index caseare collectivelya ‘cluster’. We deﬁne ‘emergence’
as a situation in which the probability that the outbreak will
spontaneously sputter to extinction is less than 10
26.
Formally, this occurs when there are m cases of the adapted
strain R0
(n) such that [R0
(n)]
m . 10
6 (May et al.2 0 0 1 ).
4. WARNING SIGNS OF ADAPTATION
We consider how ongoing pathogen adaptation could
be signalled by outbreak sizes, seeking a distribution
analogous to ﬁgure 1 but with the inclusion of adaptation.
Table 1 presents parameters for two different evolutionary
scenarios: in the ﬁrst, ‘punctuated’ scenario, all
adaptations are required together for any increase in
reproductive ﬁtness. Thus, relative to the wild-type
stage, there is little ﬁtness advantage in partial adaptation,
and only the adapted stage has a signiﬁcantly increased
ﬁtness. In the second, ‘gradual’ scenario, intermediate
adaptations confer incremental improvements in ﬁtness.
Figure 2 schematically illustrates the progression in ﬁtness
from wild-type to adapted stages for both of these
scenarios.
For illustration ﬁgure 3a shows sample time courses of
infection for a series of introductions leading to an
emergence in the punctuated scenario (movies of simu-
lations leading to these outcomes may be found in the
electronic supplementary material). Figure 3b shows the
distribution of cluster sizes arising from this series
of introductions. In this example, there were 6173 intro-
ductions before emergence. The vast majority of
introductions go extinct without transmission (i.e. cluster
size 1), but there are some instances where limited trans-
mission has occurred. Only 0.16 per cent of outbreaks
exceeded two cases.
Figure 4 extends these plots to show the general behav-
iour of cluster size distributions for both punctuated and
gradual scenarios. It displays distributions obtained from
25 independent realisations of the process of emergence,
with individual distributions distinguished by colour.
Insets show distributions for a 10-fold-reduced mutation
rate for the ﬁnal adaptive step. There is a clear variation
between the scenarios in the range of cluster sizes accu-
mulated before emergence: the punctuated scenario
causes only small clusters, rarely more than four cases
large. The gradual scenario shows a broader range of
cluster sizes, and such behaviour is due to the state
marginally below pandemic capability (R0 ¼ 0.9). As
indicated by ﬁgure 1, such values of R0 are capable of
causing large outbreaks. Indeed, reducing the mutation
rate increases the ‘dwell time’ in this state, and thus the
greatest range of cluster sizes before emergence is found
in the inset of ﬁgure 4, gradual scenario. For comparison,
crosses in the plots show the distribution of cluster sizes
from case reports of H5N1 avian inﬂuenza in Indonesia
(World Health Organization). As an aside note that,
even after more than 400 cases, the pattern of H5N1
clusters appears compatible with both punctuated and
gradual scenarios.
For simplicity, we have neglected here the possibility of
multiple index cases arising from common exposure to a
zoonotic host. Nonetheless, this does not qualitatively alter
the results above. The same applies for assuming more
steps to emergence (see electronic supplementary material
fora discussion of both). Overall, a pathogen with gradually
increasing ﬁtness and an adaptive stage marginally below
emergence capability is most likely to signal ongoing
adaptation by causing large but self-limiting outbreaks.
A pathogen undergoing a more punctuated route to
emergence is likely to afford less warning.
5. BIOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO ADAPTATION
If a pathogen causes many hundreds of cases yet fails to
show any sustained human transmission, does this mean
that it is incapable of adapting for human transmission?
More speciﬁcally, how many ‘failed’ human cases
should occur for such a conclusion?
Table 1. Parameters for punctuated and gradual scenarios,
assuming four adaptive stages. For instance, in the
punctuated scenario, the wild-type pathogen has R0 ¼ 0i n
humans. After acquiring an adaptation, it has R0 ¼ 0.1 and
so forth. Here, an adapted pathogen has R0 ¼ 2, and a
mutation rate M ¼ 0.1 is associated with all adaptive stages.
scenario R0 M
punctuated adaptation [0, 0.1, 0.1, 2] [0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0]
gradual adaptation [0, 0.1, 0.9, 2] [0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0]
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Figure 3. Illustrations of results of the model, punctuated
scenario. (a) Time series for a series of introductions
(black) leading to emergence (grey). All introductions are
initiated at time zero. (b) Distribution of cluster sizes arising
from this calculation.
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Figure 2. Schematic of (a) punctuated and (b) gradual
scenarios. Parameter values are presented in table 1.
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Proc. R. Soc. B (2009)For a given series of reproductive numbers and
mutation rates, it is possible to calculate the probability
pe of emergence, per introduction, using the theory of
multi-type branching processes (Athreya & Ney 1972).
If there are insurmountable biological barriers to
adaptation, this is equivalent to pe ¼ 0. Thus, repeated
introductions into the human population are akin to a
series of coin tosses, where the probability of ‘heads’ (cor-
responding to emergence) per toss is pe. The number of
coin tosses before the ﬁrst head follows a negative bino-
mial distribution. Assume an observation that N tosses
have yielded only tails, corresponding to a series of
failed introductions. The probability of such an outcome
is at least 50 per cent as long as
pe , 1   2ð 1=NÞ;
yielding an estimated upper bound on pe. This upper
bound, denoted U(N), is plotted in ﬁgure 5. It shows
that, regardless of how many consecutive tails, or failed
cases, have occurred, it is never possible to conclude
that pe ¼ 0. Although mathematically straightforward, in
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Figure 5. Upper bound on the probability of emergence per introduction pe, given that n introductions have occurred
without emergence (U(N)). Calculated as the maximal value of pe giving at least a 50 per cent probability of observing N intro-
ductions without emergence. Although giving inﬁnitesimally small values for pe for large N, the curve does not reach pe ¼ 0 for
any ﬁnite N. Inset shows the ‘relative information gain’ acquired as N increases, measured as the percentage drop from U(N)t o
U(Nþ1). Again, this quantity has almost entirely diminished by the time N ¼ 100.
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Figure 4. Cluster size distributions for the (a) punctuated and (b) gradual scenarios. Shown are distributions for 25 independent
realizationsoftheprocessleadingtoemergence, witheachdistributiondistinguishedbyadifferentcolour.Insetsshowdistributions
where the penultimate mutation rate has been reduced 10-fold to a value of 0.01. Crosses show H5N1 data from Indonesia.
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lack of transmission alone gives little information about
the adaptability of a pathogen. Indeed, the point is under-
scored by the behaviour of the punctuated scenario
demonstrated above: it is possible for emergence to
occur without any prior signs of increasing ﬁtness.
Another feature of ﬁgure 5 is that U(N) has diminished
by 98 per cent by the time the ﬁrst 100 cases have
occurred. That is, the ﬁrst 100 cases without emergence
indicate a very low probability of emergence per introduc-
tion. Beyond this point, continuing failed cases give little
more information about the adaptability of the pathogen.
The inset of ﬁgure 5 plots the percentage drop from U(N)
to U(Nþ1) as a function of the number of cases N, illus-
trating that even in relative terms, there is little extra
information to be derived from more than 100 cases. In
the example of H5N1 inﬂuenza, this tally was reached
by 8 June 2005 (World Health Organization 2009).
Quantitatively, according to this model, sporadic human
cases subsequent to that date teach us very little more
about whether the virus may ultimately adapt to humans.
6. EMERGENCE DETECTION
In practice, it is highly unlikely that the underlying repro-
ductive numbers for an evolving pathogen could be
known with any accuracy. Here we focus instead on
monitoring ongoing outbreaks for early signs of emer-
gence, the primary concern being rapid notiﬁcation. We
suggest a simple non-parametric method for detection
of emergence that does not rely on knowledge of the
reproductive ﬁtness parameters. An outbreak in progress
is given a ‘rarity score’, with respect to past outcomes,
deﬁned as 2log10(proportion of past outcomes that
were more extreme).
We compare two approaches: for the ‘single rarity’
approach, a record is kept of the total outbreak size
from every introduction. For an outbreak in progress, a
rarity score can then be calculated for the cumulative
number of cases. When this exceeds a given threshold,
the alarm is triggered. The ‘double rarity’ approach like-
wise monitors outbreak sizes, and additionally monitors
the daily incidence. A record is kept of the greatest
incidence reached following every introduction, and
thus a rarity score is calculated, in real time, for an out-
break in progress. An alert is then triggered where at
least one rarity score exceeds a given threshold. Speciﬁcity
is measured by the number of introductions causing a
false alarm (introductions causing an alarm and
subsequently going extinct). Sensitivity is measured, in
the event of a true emergence, by the number of cases
before the ﬁrst alarm. Figure 6 shows measures of
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Figure 6. Early warning systems for detecting pandemic emergence. The ‘single’ method monitors outbreak size, raising an alarm
if a threshold with respect to past outbreak sizes is exceeded. The ‘double’ method additionally monitors daily incidence (see text
for details). (a) Sample time courses of infection leading to emergence. Vertical, dashed line: time of notiﬁcation with the single
approach. Vertical, solid line: time of notiﬁcation with the double approach. (i) punctuated scenario (ii) gradual scenario.
(b) Graphs of algorithm performance, calculated over 250 simulated emergences, with the alarm silenced for the ﬁrst 400 intro-
ductions. Black bars, single; grey bars, double. (i, ii) Speciﬁcity is measured by number of false alarms before an emergence,
(iii, iv) while sensitivity is measured by the number of cases before an alarm occurs, in the event of a genuine emergence.
Left- and right-hand panels refer to punctuated and gradual scenarios, respectively.
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simulated as described above, under both the gradual
and punctuated scenarios. Both single and double
approaches show a similar performance under the punc-
tuated scenario. However, under the gradual scenario,
the double approach shows an appreciably better
performance in sensitivity, also doing so more consist-
ently. It raises the alarm after a mean (standard deviation)
of 4.2 (1.3) cases, compared with 5.8 (2.4) for the single
approach. As might be expected, this comes at the
expense of some speciﬁcity: the single approach causes
a mean (standard deviation) of 0.68 (0.97) false alarms
before emergence, compared with 1.0 (1.3) for the
double method. In practice, epidemiological investigation
and contact tracing will be essential for identifying which
cases are epidemiologically linked. Furthermore, we do
not address here the timing or distribution of index
cases. Nonetheless, while more sophisticated schemes
are undoubtedly possible, these results illustrate how
additional outbreak characteristics, such as incidence,
could contribute to emergence detection.
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The work presented here underlines the unpredictability
of infectious diseases undergoing adaptations for human
transmission. Nonetheless, it also illustrates that general
patterns of epidemiological behaviour can be associated
with different evolutionary pathways. The scenarios
presented here have widely different implications for
public health, and each presents its unique problem in
terms of containment. A pathogen following a punctuated
route to adaptation is liable to emergence without any
warning. Moreover, under this scenario, large outbreaks
tend to be caused only by adapted pathogens, and so
such outbreaks will be comparatively difﬁcult to contain.
By contrast, the gradual route offers some warning of
adaptation in the form of large but self-limiting outbreaks.
Both these clusters and the early stages of emergence are
composed mainly of cases of a partially adapted
pathogen, rendering containment comparatively easier.
However, a danger is that repeated false alarms would
elicit repeated containment efforts, potentially draining
valuable resources.
There are many possible reﬁnements to the simple
model of transmission presented here. One shortfall in
the model is where large numbers of infection are pre-
dicted: in reality, large outbreaks will tend to be limited
by local depletion of susceptibles, as well as being likely
to trigger spontaneous social distancing and public health
interventions. Host heterogeneity may also play a role.
For example, Lloyd-Smith et al.( 2 0 0 5 )point out in the
context of a non-adapting pathogen that individual vari-
ation in transmissibility, hidden by a population-level
value for R0, can have a strong effect on the outcomes of
introductions, making extinction more likely than in a
homogeneous population. Yates et al.( 2 0 0 6 )explore
different types of heterogeneity, including susceptibility to
infection, and make the elegant distinction that, for non-
adapted stages, the rate of adaptation has a stronger
effect on probability of extinction than heterogeneity, and
conversely for adapted stages. Extending this discussion
to cluster sizes before emergence, these and other aspects
of host population structure would be areas for
reﬁnement in models more detailed than those we have
presented here. Nonetheless, the general insights offered
by our approach are likely to remain valid. While
mathematical models can be no replacement for detailed
epidemiological investigations in the ﬁeld, such as contact
tracing and laboratory analysis, we hope we have
shown here that they can offer valuable, objective insights
into potential pre-emergence scenarios. Together with
established frameworks for rapid case identiﬁcation
and management, mathematical models can play an
important role in our toolkit for preparedness in public
health.
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